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Abstract 
Why do skill formation systems put SMEs at greater disadvantage in some countries than 
others vis-à-vis large employers? By comparing vocational education and training (VET) 
institutions and their differential effect on firms of different sizes across three countries (UK, 
Italy, and Germany), we show that the design of VET has profound implications for shap-
ing the ability of SMEs to use institutions as resources. In particular, quasi-market institu-
tions in the UK amplify SMEs’ disadvantage, while non-market coordinating institutions 
in Italy and Germany narrow the gap between SMEs and large employers. By unpacking 
the comparative disadvantage of SMEs, we offer important nuances to the argument that 
institutions help firms coordinate their business activities in different varieties of capitalism.
Keywords: comparative political economy, firm size, small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), varieties of capitalism, vocational education and training (VET)
Zusammenfassung
Warum erfahren kleine und mittelständische Unternehmen (KMU) durch Berufsbildungs-
systeme mehr Nachteile als große Unternehmen und warum ist dieser Unterschied in man-
chen Ländern größer als in anderen? Wir vergleichen Ausbildungsinstitutionen und ihren 
unterschiedlichen Effekt auf Firmen verschiedener Größe in drei Ländern (Großbritannien, 
Italien und Deutschland). Dabei zeigen wir, dass die Art der Institutionen die Möglichkeit 
von Firmen, die vorhandenen Institutionen als Ressource zu nutzen, beeinflusst. Insbeson-
dere verstärken die in Großbritannien vorherrschenden quasimarktlichen Institutionen den 
Nachteil von KMU, wohingegen nichtmarktliche Institutionen in Italien und Deutschland 
den Unterschied zu großen Unternehmen verringern. Durch das Aufzeigen des komparati-
ven Nachteils von KMU leistet unser Papier einen Beitrag zu einer nuancierteren Sichtweise 
der Rolle von Institutionen in verschiedenen Spielarten des Kapitalismus.
Schlagwörter: Berufsbildung, kleine und mittlere Unternehmen (KMU), Spielarten des 
Kapitalismus, Unternehmensgröβe, Vergleichende Politische Ökonomie
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Not All Firms Are Created Equal: SMEs and Vocational 
Training in the UK, Italy, and Germany
1 Introduction
A vast comparative political economy (CPE) literature documented and explained vari-
ation in vocational education and training (VET) institutions across countries and their 
effect on firms’ training provision (Busemeyer and Trampusch 2011; Hall and Soskice 
2001; Thelen 2004). Yet, much of the “original” CPE literature has neglected the role of 
firm-level characteristics, including organizational size, in shaping the relationship be-
tween institutions and firms (see Hancké, Rhodes, and Thatcher 2007). This shortcom-
ing has been partly addressed by a growing stream of literature that analysed differences 
across firms – and ensuing differences in policy preferences – to explain institutional 
change in VET systems (Culpepper 2007; Thelen and Busemeyer 2012; Trampusch 
2010). However, how institutions affect the ability of firms of different size to recruit 
workers with appropriate skills and/or to develop their workforce skills is still much less 
understood. This study seeks to tackle this research problem by paying special attention 
to the role of organizational size in affecting the relationship between (VET) institu-
tions and firm (training) behaviour. 
SMEs typically find it more difficult than large employers to acquire the skills they need 
either because they cannot attract talent from external labour markets or because they 
do not have the resources to develop these skills internally through training (OECD 
2019; Wilkinson 1999). However, we argue and demonstrate empirically that institu-
tions can reduce or amplify SMEs’ disadvantage. The British quasi-market VET system, 
in particular, fails to provide an adequate supply of workers with technical skills that 
SMEs could hire from the external market. In parallel, British SMEs also face high bar-
riers to developing skills through the apprenticeship system. Such barriers take the form 
of high training costs that in turn dampen SMEs’ participation in the apprenticeship 
system (see Section 3). Indeed, British SMEs face higher expenditure per trainee than 
their large counterparts, which is a puzzling observation given that the literature has 
both theorised and showed empirically that large employers generally spend more than 
SMEs on training. How can we explain the British case?
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To answer our research question, we bring together insights from the CPE literature on 
VET (see Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012) and the management literature on organi-
zational size (see Josefy et al. 2015). We identify (1) access to skills and (2) development 
of skills as two critical dimensions that capture the overall ability of firms to ensure 
the availability of skills. Our analysis shows that these two dimensions are analytically 
distinct and that differentiating between them enables us to engage in a fine-grained 
theorisation of the institutional sources of the disadvantage of SMEs in different variet-
ies of capitalism. 
Based primarily on document analysis and thirty-seven semi-structured interviews, we 
conduct an in-depth analysis of the UK case, coupled with shadow case studies of Italy 
and Germany. According to the literature, the three countries exhibit distinct models 
of skill formation underpinned by distinct coordination mechanisms: market-led coor-
dination in the UK, business-led coordination in Germany, and state-led coordination 
in Italy (Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012). We show that various mechanisms of non-
market coordination that are present in Italy and Germany – but not in the UK – work 
toward levelling the playing field for SMEs. Non-market institutions support SMEs by 
facilitating either their access to skills or their participation in skill development by keep-
ing training costs for SMEs (relatively) low. This stands in sharp contrast to the British 
case, where quasi-market institutions put SMEs at a systematic disadvantage. 
By unpacking the comparative institutional disadvantage of SMEs vis-à-vis large em-
ployers, we also show that national VET institutions are significantly more heteroge-
neous than commonly assumed in the CPE literature. We find that institutions do not 
simply function indiscriminately as coordination mechanisms, but that they have a 
mediating effect on inequalities between firms of different size. Furthermore, the insti-
tutional mechanisms in place for SMEs do not necessarily reflect the dominant modes 
of coordination in each of the models of capitalism under study. In particular, we find 
state intervention to be an important feature of the German and British VET systems – 
despite these two systems being commonly characterised as, respectively, business- and 
market-led in the literature. Equally, decentralised cooperation between firms, schools, 
and local authorities in the form of local networks play a significant role in the Italian 
system – traditionally identified as centralised and state-led. 
The article is organized as follows. The following section discusses the CPE literature on 
employers and VET, while Section 3 presents our empirical puzzle on the gap between 
SMEs and large employers. After the methodology section, we present our findings 
from the case study of Britain and the shadow cases of Italy and Germany. The final sec-
tion discusses the findings and derives their theoretical implications. 
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2 Institutions, firms, and training
The CPE literature has produced a rich body of work that analyses skill formation sys-
tems across countries (see Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012 for an overview). Before out-
lining how our analysis builds on this scholarship, we review here the two main streams 
of research, focusing on the role that each approach assigns to institutions and firms: the 
original body of work of varieties of capitalism (VoC) scholars and a second – more re-
cent – strand of research on the role of business for institutional change in the VET arena.
The original VoC scholarship sought “to bring firms back into the centre of the analysis 
of comparative capitalism” (Hall and Soskice 2001, 4). In the realm of training, VoC 
scholars referred to the institutional context to explain why firms in some countries are 
active and successful at training, while “failure of training” is pervasive in other coun-
tries (Culpepper 2001; Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001; Finegold and Soskice 
1988; Hall and Soskice 2001; Thelen and Culpepper 2007). 
The benchmark the VoC literature upheld as a successful training system was the Ger-
man apprenticeship system. There, rigid employment protection legislation and strong 
and encompassing collective bargaining institutions constituted incentives for firms to 
commit to high-quality training, resulting in authoritatively certified industry-specific 
skills (Culpepper 2001; Soskice 1994; Thelen 2007). Hence, non-market institutions that 
structure strategic coordination among firms are the key factor underpinning successful 
training systems in so-called coordinated market economies (CMEs). The counter-ex-
ample has often been the British system, where weak or absent coordinating institutions 
lead to major collective action problems, as fear of poaching provides a disincentive for 
business to train, contributing to locking firms in production strategies premised on low 
skills and low costs (Finegold and Soskice 1988; Thelen and Culpepper 2007). 
The VoC approach thus views institutions in the labour market and industrial relations 
arena as main independent variables, which, as complementary domains, produce com-
bined effects on the willingness and ability of firms to train. Overall, this body of lit-
erature provides fundamental tools to understand variation in skill formation systems, 
grounded in an institutionalist framework inspired by rational-choice theories (Hall and 
Taylor 1996). Yet, when studying how institutions affect strategic interaction in a given 
arena, VoC scholars have disregarded the varying ability of firms to leverage training 
institutions as resources across different varieties of capitalism. Firm size, and how it 
may influence this ability, was only touched upon in Hancké (2001), who discussed how 
liberalisation in the French political economy since the mid-eighties led to a shift from 
state-led to large-firm-led coordination. Indeed, the VoC literature has been criticised 
for its overly homogenous depiction of national political economies, leaving little room 
for “within-system” diversity (e. g., Lane and Wood 2012), including at the level of firms 
(Crouch, Schröder, and Voelzkow 2009). This was also attributed to its implicit or explicit 
large-firm bias, i. e., the focus on large firms as representative of all firms in a political 
economy (see Hancké, Rhodes, and Thatcher 2007 for more elaboration on this aspect).
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Yet, “within-system” diversity in the form of inter-employer cleavages is at the core of 
a second stream of CPE research grounded in historical-institutionalist approaches, 
which addresses the question of continuity and change in skill formation systems (Buse-
meyer and Trampusch 2013; Culpepper 2007; Dobbins and Busemeyer 2014; Durazzi 
and Geyer 2019; Emmenegger and Seitzl 2018; Martin 1999; Thelen 2004; 2007; Tram-
pusch 2010). This stream of literature focuses on firms as collectively organized political 
agents and analyses how employer associations shape training policy. In other words, it 
conceives training institutions as a dependent variable, while inter-employer cleavages 
have emerged as key variable to explain institutional change in skill formation systems. 
This literature argues that large and small employers “use” vocational training for dif-
ferent purposes due to differences in resources and skill requirements; hence, they have 
different preferences toward vocational training policy and seek to influence policy 
change accordingly. A recurrent finding in this respect has been identified in a “seg-
mentalist trend” that collective skill formation systems in CMEs have been subject to. 
Where large employers’ interests prevail – chiefly in the case of Germany but also to an 
extent in Switzerland – training systems are expected to provide skills that are more 
closely attuned to (large) firm needs and less to the wider needs of industry, i. e., they 
become less collectivist and more segmentalist. Where, on the other hand, small firms 
prevail (e. g., in Austria), skill formation systems remain relatively stable and keep pro-
viding more “general” skills certified at the industry level (Culpepper 2007; Emmeneg-
ger and Seitzl 2018; Graf 2018; Thelen and Busemeyer 2012; Trampusch 2010). This 
approach demonstrates the value of zooming in on the relationship between firms and 
training policy, highlighting the importance of firms’ size in shaping their preferences 
toward training policy. 
Yet, it equally leaves open a number of questions. While pointing out the role of inter-
employer cleavages, the literature mainly focuses on the different positions of large ver-
sus small employers – in fact, of their employers’ associations – on national policy re-
forms. Therefore, it does not examine how institutions might work differently for SMEs 
compared to large employers when it comes to skill formation. Hence, to tackle the 
question of the varying effect of institutions on firms of different size (see the next sec-
tion), we go back to the “original” VoC concern on the effect of institutions on firms 
– conceived here as economic and individual actors and not as political and collective 
actors – but we utilise the cleavage perspective put forward by the second stream of 
literature, which has an eye for the relationship between different institutional arrange-
ments and organizational size.
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3 Puzzle and argument
As discussed, we seek to explore the disadvantage experienced by SMEs as they try to 
source the skills they need from their national VET system. We conceptualise the dis-
advantage as taking two ideal typical forms. First, it can consist of the inability of SMEs 
to access the skills from the external labour market. Building on the classic distinction 
in the management literature between “make” or “buy” (Williamson 1985), we concep-
tualize the relative difficulty of accessing skills as a disadvantage in the “buy” dimen-
sion. Second, SMEs can also face unique obstacles when trying to develop those skills by 
themselves in the workplace and/or in partnership with schools and training providers. 
We conceptualise this second dimension as a problem related to “make” skills. 
The management literature shows that both types of disadvantage are typically experi-
enced by SMEs. Firstly, SMEs tend to offer lower wages and non-wage benefits and they 
tend to suffer from lower reputation, making it difficult for them to access skills by re-
cruiting skilled workers (Edwards and Ram 2006). Secondly, SMEs have fewer financial 
and staff resources than large employers, making it more difficult for them to develop 
skills, e. g., by offering apprenticeship programmes. As a result, their overall training is 
significantly lower and much less formalised than in large firms (Storey 2004). More-
over, their production processes and technology are less complex so they have lower 
expected returns from investments in training, which creates strong disincentives to 
allocate resources to vocational training (Almeida and Aterido 2010). Hence, SMEs 
typically are less involved in vocational training than large employers and, when they 
do train, they tend to provide training of inferior depth and breadth. Their training is 
shorter and more informal, and skills are often learned on-the-job without dedicated 
qualified instructors. This echoes the more general observation that HR practices in 
SMEs often take a more informal form than in large firms (Cassell et al. 2002).
However, a clear message stemming from the VoC literature is that companies are faced 
with different opportunities and constraints, depending on the institutional context 
within which they are embedded (Hall and Soskice 2001). In the case of training, we 
expect that national VET institutions alleviate or amplify SMEs’ disadvantage. In this 
article, we focus on the UK as an example of a system that prevents SMEs both from 
accessing and developing the skills they need. We argue that the disadvantage of Brit-
ish SMEs is explained by national VET institutions, and we show this by means of a 
detailed case study of VET policy in the UK, accompanied by shadow cases of Italy and 
Germany.
British vocational education is distinguished by two paths: a school-based system, 
which is publicly funded and should allow companies to access skills without being 
involved in skill formation, and the apprenticeship system, which requires business in-
volvement in skill development. The British school-based provision of vocational skills 
has a long-standing issue of low quality, which dates to back at least to the 1990s (Wolf 
2011). Vocational education (pre-18) is state-funded even though institutions provid-
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ing training also include private schools and training providers. The government has 
therefore created a quasi-market for training, which is characterised by a proliferation 
of qualifications of dubious quality, due to and enabled by different factors. Government 
funding is assigned to schools and training providers based on the number of qualifica-
tions they offer and on the number of students awarded a qualification. Rather than im-
proving quality, those institutions have increased the number of qualifications offered 
and focused on ensuring a high completion rate. Furthermore, as qualifications are not 
awarded by the state but by competing awarding bodies, which are concerned about 
losing their “clients,” the system is clearly not geared toward maintaining high standards 
in key qualifications (Gambin and Hogarth 2015; Wolf 2011). Frequent government 
reforms of the education system,1 which often changed the qualification system, fur-
ther contributed to making English vocational education “extraordinarily complex and 
opaque by European and international standards” (Wolf 2011, 9). While it is difficult 
to find comparative data on the quality of vocational education, the pupil/teacher ratio 
is a suggestive proxy of the poor state of the British vocational school-based education 
system. The ratio is twenty-five in the UK, which is the highest in Europe and thirteen 
percentage points higher than the European average (Eurostat 2019). Furthermore, al-
most 85 percent of the qualifications attained in the school-based system are at Level 2 
or below (Gambin and Hogarth 2015, 7), while school-based vocational qualifications 
(e. g., in Italy) as well as qualifications from dual vocational systems (e. g., in Germany) 
usually correspond to at least Level 3. 
As a response to the lack of relevant and high-quality school-based vocational pro-
grammes (UKCES 2012; Wolf 2011), successive governments have been trying to re-
vitalise the apprenticeship system since the mid-1990s (Fortwengel, Gospel, and Toner 
2019), thereby promoting employer participation in skill development. Although this 
emphasis on skill development came with increasing requirements of co-investment 
from business, especially since the introduction of a training levy in 2015 (see Sec-
tion 5), employers welcomed this shift. In particular, moving from a centralised to an 
employer-owned system provided firms with more control over the content and qual-
ity of the vocational educational offer, addressing the main traditional pitfalls of the 
school-based system (Hogarth et al. 2014). Yet, despite the increasing emphasis on en-
gaging firms in the training system, the British apprenticeship system did not trigger 
any meaningful participation of SMEs in skill development (Bishop 2015). 
As the problem of training for SMEs came increasingly under the spotlight (see, e. g., 
FE Week 2019b), governments tried to adjust the system of funding for training to the 
advantage of SMEs (see Section 5). Yet, empirical evidence suggests that these attempts 
1 Testifying to the extraordinary high frequency of reform, a recently-assembled dataset of pub-
lic-policy reforms across OECD countries shows that between 1995 and 2013, there were nine 
reforms of the British VET system. Over the same timeframe, there was only one major reform 
in each Germany and Italy (Armingeon et al. 2019). While it is not entirely clear if reforms are 
a cause or an effect of problems in the VET arena, their high frequency certainly suggests that 
policymakers in the UK feel the need for reform. 
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did not produce meaningful results. Available data show that the training participation 
rate among large employers (>250 employees) stands at 68.8 percent, and that this rate 
drops to 26.6 percent for SMEs (20–49 employees). This gap is 10 percent larger than 
the EU average (Eurostat 2018). Moreover, costs are unevenly distributed between large 
employers and SMEs but not in the direction that we would expect according to the lit-
erature: strikingly, British SMEs spend more, on average, per trainee than large employ-
ers. UKCES (2016) reports that companies with between five and twenty-four employ-
ees spend £3,800 per employee/year, companies between twenty-five and ninety-nine 
employees spend £2,800 per employee/year, and employers with above 100 employees 
spend £1,800 per employee/year. 
We explain the conundrum of British SMEs by going back to Hall and Soskice’s original 
claim that the institutional context provides resources to firms for the coordination of 
their business activities and enables them to excel in certain industries and through 
particular product market strategies. However, not all firms are created equal: our 
central claim is that the extent to which firms rely on institutions for the purpose of 
coordinating their business activities varies depending on their size. The literature in 
the field of management and organization studies indeed claims that size influences an 
“organization’s ability to acquire and retain resources” (Josefy et al. 2015, 740) making 
large firms “less dependent on external sources for resources” (Josefy et al. 2015, 741). 
Furthermore, large firms also benefit from substantial economies of scale (see Josefy et 
al. 2015, 742). As a function of their size, they are able to reduce per unit costs, which 
are, in our case, the costs of investing in specialised training equipment and in-house 
trainers. Finally, large employers have more influence on other actors in the market (or 
in an institutional arena), which are less likely to dissolve network ties with them (see 
Josefy et al. 2015, 746). In the words of VoC scholars, large employers find it easier to 
build forms of non-market coordination with other actors, and/or rely on hierarchy as 
primary mode for coordinating their business activities. 
These considerations suggest that firms, depending on their size, differ in the extent to 
which they rely on institutional inputs. This argument has important implications for 
the dominant view in CPE regarding the interdependence between firms and institu-
tions. More specifically, we draw attention to the observation that institutions may be of 
particular importance to SMEs compared to large employers; the latter are less reliant 
on the support offered by institutions, because they can produce similar outcomes on 
their own, as a function of their size. But what are the characteristics of institutional 
design which support SMEs in their skill endeavour? 
The CPE literature offers a two-dimensional categorisation of VET systems, based on the 
levels of (1) firms’ commitment and (2) governments’ commitment to VET (see Buse-
meyer and Trampusch 2012). These dimensions are crucial to develop our argument. In 
school-based systems (e. g., France, Italy, Sweden), companies’ involvement in skill for-
mation is minimal as they can access a pool of skilled workers upon completion of their 
school-based training. The state is therefore the primary provider of training, and the 
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resources that companies need to invest are potentially limited to on-the-job training. In 
such a system – commonly referred to as statist skill formation system – SMEs essentially 
shift the costs of training onto the state as they do not contribute much to developing 
skills. In other words, they “buy” ready-made skills, rather than “make” them.
In so-called collective skill formation systems (e. g., Austria, Denmark, Germany), com-
panies are the primary training providers (through apprenticeships) while governments, 
compared to school-based systems, are relatively less involved. The “make” dimension, 
in other words, dominates over the “buy” dimension. These systems are therefore more 
resource intensive for firms than statist systems for various reasons: firms need to have 
knowledge and staff to develop and manage training programmes; they need to in-
vest financial resources to pay trainers and apprentices’ wages; and they need to have 
and maintain machines and labs to be used for training purposes. Yet, as previously 
mentioned, institutions can help firms in coordinating collective skill formation in sev-
eral ways. Firstly, the involvement of social partners (chiefly employer associations and 
unions) in the governance of the VET system is central to firms’ engagement with the 
VET system. Employer associations participate in developing and monitoring training 
standards, which often operate at the sectoral level. Secondly, employer associations 
and chambers of commerce can provide companies – including SMEs – with informa-
tion and expertise to help them navigate the system (Culpepper 2003; Hall and Soskice 
2001). Thirdly, the presence of interfirm networks also contributes to sharing knowl-
edge and best practices among companies as well as to ensure cooperative outcomes 
(Thelen and Culpepper 2007). Networks have been found to be particularly helpful for 
SMEs to achieve economies of scale in their business activities, an argument that can 
also apply to the training arena (Perrow 1993).
Our argument is therefore that the institutional disadvantage of SMEs in the UK ap-
prenticeship system is anchored in its quasi-market for training, which does not pro-
vide technical skills that companies can access from the school system (unlike a statist 
skill formation system), while also setting high financial and administrative barriers for 
those SMEs willing to develop the skills they need (unlike a collective skill formation 
system). To better identify the pitfalls of the British institutional design, we conduct an 
in-depth case study of VET policy and its impact on SMEs in the UK and we contrast it 
with shadow cases of a statist skill formation system (Italy) and a collective skill forma-
tion system (Germany). 
4 Methodology
Unlike historical studies, which map the evolution and change of institutions, our in-
terest is in revealing the effect of different institutional settings on the ability of SMEs 
to buy and make skills. The British case is at the centre of our empirical analysis while 
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Italy and Germany are used as shadow case studies to maximise variation along the 
main analytical dimension of interest (see Hancké 2009, 75), i. e., the institutional de-
sign of the VET system. To “isolate” the effect of the institutional design, we hold the ap-
prenticeship programme we focus on constant across the three countries: mechatronics, 
which is an interdisciplinary programme generating skills useful in a variety of high-
tech manufacturing settings. The mechatronics curriculum is a particularly suitable 
case to study how institutions can contribute to solve “coordination problems” because 
it is comparatively expensive. In the UK the annual spending for a Level 3 mechatronics 
apprenticeship is around £11,300, while that for a retail apprenticeship is around £3,000 
and a financial services apprenticeship around £5,300 (Gambin and Hogarth 2017, 11). 
Furthermore, there is no significant difference in terms of cost per apprentice between 
the German and British systems, as German companies spend €14,327/year per ap-
prentice (2012/13). Thus the challenge to develop mechatronic skills is, at least in terms 
of upfront costs, similar in the two countries where business involvement is required 
in the process of skill formation. At the same time, in all three countries, mechatronics 
technicians were indicated as the most sought-after occupational profile in the inter-
views with manufacturers and their employers’ associations. 
We rely on thirty-seven semi-structured interviews as our key data source. Almost all 
interviews were conducted by the first author in the native language of the interview 
respondent, that is, in either English, German, or Italian. They were conducted face-to-
face or over the phone. The first author also visited five training centres and four schools 
and attended a two-day employer association meeting on training in Germany. In the 
UK, she attended a meeting of an association of training providers, two open days for 
apprentices and two manufacturing fairs including training-related information events. 
We used NVivo11, a software programme for the analysis of qualitative data, to code 
all policy documents, interview transcripts, fieldwork notes from the visits and parti-
cipant observations, international reports, and information brochures. We used the 
source classification to achieve a better overview of the number and type of items anal-
ysed by country case (see table A1 in the Appendix). We also used theme nodes, which 
essentially are text codes or keywords, to describe and categorise the content of the 
data. Through this process, we were also able to identify the first connections between 
themes that emerged from the empirical material and concepts gained through the lit-
erature review (Saldaña 2009). The theme nodes were then grouped in four main nodes 
to integrate our data in a narrative comparable across cases, which developed around 
what emerged as the core categories with explanatory relevance. The core explanatory 
nodes are “coordination,” which includes the role of different actors and institutions 
as instruments for coordinating SMEs’ training activities; and two categories referring 
respectively to the role of “skill suppliers” (e. g., schools or training providers) and to 
the “standards” regulating the quality, content, and structure of VET. We analytically 
link these functions of institutions to the relative ability of SMEs to access (“buy”) and 
develop (“make”) skills across the three countries. Our outcome of interest is captured 
by the node “SMEs (dis)advantage,” which includes several subcategories illustrating 
the resources that SMEs can (or cannot) draw upon and the challenges that they face. 
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5 Findings
The United Kingdom 
The British2 VET system has been commonly depicted in the CPE literature as a system 
where “training decisions were essentially left to the vicissitudes of the market” (Stuart 
and Cooney 2008, 347). Since the mid-1970s, unions have lost members and political 
influence, as have employers’ associations, limiting their role to lobbying and providing 
advising services (Gooberman, Hauptmeier, and Heery 2019; Kelly 2015). In addition, 
during the 1980s the Thatcher government abolished Industrial Training Boards (Gos-
pel and Edwards 2012; Rainbird 2009). Over time, British employers drastically reduced 
their investment in training – mainly out of fear of poaching – and the British political 
economy ended up in the notorious “low-skill equilibrium” (Finegold and Soskice 1988). 
Yet, in contrast with the focus on “pure” market forces of political economists, empiri-
cal contributions, primarily by education scholars, rather depicted British employers as 
subject to the vicissitudes of government’s training reforms, aiming to create an effec-
tive quasi-market for training (Fleckenstein and Lee 2018; Gospel and Edwards 2012; 
Keep 1999; 2006; Ryan and Unwin 2001; Steedman, Gospel, and Ryan 1998). Building 
on these findings and mobilising new empirical evidence, the following section analy-
ses the relevant features of the British VET system. We structure our description of the 
British case in a pre-levy and a post-levy section, acknowledging the radical policy shift 
that took place in 2017 when the government introduced an employer levy system. 
Pre-levy system
Since the mid-1990s, governments of all stripes have attempted to revive the VET sys-
tem (Fortwengel, Gospel, and Toner 2019). In 2000, the government introduced the 
framework for National Vocational Qualifications (NVQs), which set occupational qual-
ification standards, in collaboration with employer-dominated Sectoral Skill Councils. 
NVQs (usually up to Level 3) constituted the central element of government-funded 
apprenticeships, in combination with the more “academic” Technical Certificate and 
Key Skills Qualifications, including IT and numeracy. NVQs left significant room for 
variation in the content and quality of training even within the same sector. They were 
outcome-based and delivered and assessed in the workplace; furthermore, the standards 
were vague, e. g., the hours of “guided learning” included in an engineering3 apprentice-
ship could vary from 240 to 1,250 hours for the same qualification (Ryan et al. 2006, 364). 
2 While some general institutional traits are applicable to the UK as a whole, specific issues 
around training refer exclusively to England.
3 In the UK “mechatronics apprenticeships” are often called “engineering apprenticeships.”
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This vagueness left ample room for manoeuvre for the third central actor in the British 
quasi-market for training, namely training providers. While employers’ financial contri-
bution remained discretional, the government allocated funding to central agencies4 to 
redistribute through local Skills Councils and Education Authorities down to training 
providers (Cuddy, Leney, and Bousquet 2005, 57). As the main goal was to meet govern-
ment targets in terms of apprenticeship starts, funded training places did not necessarily 
reflect local skill demands, as the main “customer” of training providers was the govern-
ment – not local employers. Without the incentive to match the skill demand, training 
providers offered training courses in those subjects that did not require a sizeable invest-
ment in infrastructure, e. g., in business administration rather than engineering, which 
requires expensive laboratories (Interview 1; Automotive Industrial Partnership 2016). 
To capture more funds, training providers would also lower the quality of training, tak-
ing advantage of the abovementioned “flexible” outcome-based standards (Wolf 2011). 
Employers’ reactions to such an “unresponsive” system were varied. Some large employ-
ers became certified training providers to capture government funding and to control 
the content and quality of training. Others preferred to deepen their partnership with 
training providers, e. g., by collaborating in curriculum development or providing tech-
nologies and even teaching staff (Interviews 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12). However, as we discuss later, 
these are not viable options for SMEs. Hence, SMEs by and large withdrew from the 
apprenticeship programme promoted by the government and purchased specialised and 
shorter courses from private training providers, which would address their immediate 
business needs. This contributed to watering down the market value of the apprentice-
ship and to a proliferation of various forms of training, ultimately making the vocational 
training market difficult to navigate for employers and students alike (UKCES 2011). 
Post-levy system
Since the 2010s, VET reforms tried to address the flaws outlined above by providing 
employers with more power to influence training provision and to design coherent 
standards (DfE/BIS 2013). The NVQ framework was replaced by the apprenticeship 
standards developed by so-called trailblazer groups, which are mainly constituted by 
employers. In the case of mechatronics standards, the trailblazer group includes em-
ployer associations (such as SEMTA and the Engineering Employers' Federation) and 
the Institute of Mechanical Engineers, but most of the participants are large (automo-
tive) companies such as Jaguar Land Rover, and Toyota. The trailblazer group developed 
clear standards, which are supervised and accredited by the Institute for Apprentice-
ships. The standards also define the content of the end-point assessment, consisting of a 
workplace-based portfolio and Viva, as well as a competence-based exam performed by 
4 Learning and Skills Development Agency (2000–2006); Quality Improvement Agency (2006–
2008); Learning Skills Council (2001–2010); Education Funding Agency (EFA) (2012–2017); 
Skills Funding Agency (2010–2017). 
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an externally accredited institution, which also conducts a quality assurance check on 
the Employer Viva Documentation. 
The funding structure was progressively decentralised until the introduction of the Ap-
prenticeship Levy in 2017. Under this new system, all employers receive a £15,000 al-
lowance per apprentice to be offset against payment of the levy, which is now payable 
at 0.5 percent of the wage bill for firms whose wage bill is above £3m. The levy can only 
be used for trailblazer apprenticeships, and levy-paying employers release the funds 
directly to the training provider from their digital service account. In this way, the train-
ing provider is more responsive to employers’ needs (Interviews 5, 6). In contrast, SMEs, 
which do not pay the levy, are covered by the co-investment plan of the government for 
95% of the apprenticeship costs (90% before 2019). The co-investment funding is al-
located directly to training providers, similarly to the previous system. The government 
sets funding caps, which vary depending on the type of apprenticeship. The maximum 
estimated fee for a mechatronics/engineering apprenticeship is £27,000 in total, exclud-
ing the fee for the end-point assessment (around £3,000). 
Challenges for SMEs
The British VET system presents SMEs with several challenges. First, while SMEs have 
typically provided apprenticeship at NVQ Level 2 rather than at Level 3 in the pre-levy 
system (FSB 2019), apprenticeship standards have become increasingly complex and 
holistic. They are “gold-plated,” as one interviewee described them (Interview 7), espe-
cially in the mechatronics curriculum, which was inspired by the German dual appren-
ticeship (Interviews 2, 3). Two aspects are critical for SMEs: the “academic” component, 
which they consider excessive since the introduction of the requirement for 20 percent 
off-the-job training; and the end-point assessment, which involves extra costs not cov-
ered by government funding without a clear added value for employers (Interview 7, 8). 
Due to these additional costs and insufficiently high government caps, many SMEs still 
prefer purchasing ad-hoc training courses, rather than participating in the apprentice-
ship system, as in the pre-levy system (see also Green and Hogarth 2016). Hence, SMEs’ 
skill demand is very fragmented. 
Despite their complexity and the introduction of the end-point assessment, standards 
are competence-based, similar to the NVQ framework, and do not prescribe the con-
tent and structure of the curriculum, e. g., the number of hours and the modules. Hence, 
individual employers and training providers need to develop the actual curriculum, 
which requires considerable knowledge and coordination efforts from the employers’ 
side. This increases the initial costs of setting up an apprenticeship, especially as SMEs’ 
skill demands are fragmented and uncoordinated, and training providers have consid-
erable power vis-à-vis SMEs, as explained below. 
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Indeed, the structure of funding contributes to reducing the influence of SMEs on train-
ing providers. Large employers have more leverage over training providers because they 
provide the latter with a sizeable number of apprentices each year, making them finan-
cially attractive clients; furthermore, since the introduction of the levy, large employers 
can use the funding more flexibly, e. g., they are able to cover the training costs even 
if they exceed the government cap (Interviews 2, 3, 5). In contrast, SMEs still rely on 
centrally allocated government funding. Therefore, once they assess the need for an 
apprenticeship, they first need to find training providers open to non-levy-paying em-
ployers. Indeed, not all training providers accept being allocated government funding, 
which is more likely to run out and is strictly capped (FE Week 2019a; 2019b). Our in-
terview partners working for training providers and government bodies confirmed that 
the funding cap set by the government is especially insufficient to cover 90–95 percent 
of the costs of the expensive mechatronics apprenticeship (Interviews 7, 8, 9, 10). 
But even if the training providers accepted non-levy paying employers, there are fur-
ther obstacles. In a survey conducted by the Federation of Small Businesses in 2018, 
51 percent of SMEs reported as major obstacle the “availability of courses or places at 
training providers”; a quarter of the respondents pointed to the “distance to the near-
est training provider” (FSB 2019). While SMEs are more likely to be in rural areas than 
large employers (Defra UK 2019), training providers have an interest in establishing 
their operations in areas with a higher population and employer density, which entails 
a potentially larger demand (differently from Italy and Germany, where governments 
ensure a homogeneous distribution of schools across the national territory, see next 
sections). Hence, providers specialising in the relevant subject area might be far away, 
forcing the company to incur additional transportation costs; indeed, SMEs in rural 
areas reported higher costs for an apprenticeship than those in urban areas (FSB 2019). 
As a final hurdle, even if SMEs find a close enough training provider with an appropri-
ate training offer, training providers might require an entire cohort to start the appren-
ticeship programme needed by the SME, but there might not be enough students. An 
interview partner working for a training provider clearly explains the incentive system 
and the limitations tied to the levy funding:
We have had companies that [say] “yes, we would love to work with you to deliver a bespoke train-
ing programme and we want to use our levy pot for it.” Well […] if it’s just for one company, we 
can't get an apprenticeship to it and you want five people on it, no we can't do it. (Interview 9)
Due to their limited funding and facilities, which prevent them from purchasing be-
spoke training, SMEs would need, instead, to coordinate their skill demands. While this 
is primarily a responsibility of local chambers of commerce and employers’ associations 
in Germany and Italy (see next sections), these organizations are extremely weak in the 
UK. For example, an official in the small employers’ association describes the limits of 
its responsibility as follows: 
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We are an organisation that represents their interest[s], we don't help them with [training], un-
less they have queries and they call the call centre customer services and ask questions, specific 
questions on apprenticeships or training. We are not a provider, we don't help them with finding 
apprentices or recruiting them so that's not the kind of thing we do. (Interview 11)
The government set up organizations to coordinate SMEs and to stir training providers 
into meeting the local skill demand, but they are not representative and therefore benefit 
little from the employers’ buy-in (Almond, Ferner, and Tregaskis 2015); furthermore, 
they were often re-configured over time. The most recent example of these agencies is the 
Local Enterprise Partnerships, which were set up by the government in 2010 to replace 
the Regional Development Agencies in order to better overlap with local labour market 
areas. These partnerships should promote local development by assessing local econom-
ic priorities, improving infrastructures, stimulating job growth, and raising the skills of 
the local workforce. While Local Enterprise Partnerships should be “business-led,” they 
do not have a mandate to represent all local business actors and they have been criticised 
for being dominated (similarly to trailblazer groups) by large employers, who possess 
ample human as well as financial resources, to participate in partnership-coordinated 
initiatives (FSB 2014; NAO 2016). When asked about Local Enterprise Partnerships, our 
interview partners in the manufacturing employers’ association and government bodies 
were indeed very sceptical about their effectiveness (Interviews 7, 8, 13).
To sum up, without coordinating their skill demand from the outset, SMEs are unable 
to influence the offer of training providers and to build the economies of scale, which 
would be necessary to reduce the costs per apprentice. On the other hand, training 
providers can contribute to help SMEs by coordinating their skill demands “at the end.” 
Training providers typically try to mix and match different, already running, units in 
order to fulfil the requirements of the apprenticeship programme and to address the 
demand of SMEs for a specific skill set. This might impair the quality of the training, 
though. First, as suggested by one of our interview partners in a relevant government 
body, the practice of “re-cycling” courses for the trailblazer apprenticeship casts doubt 
on the added value of those standards compared to already existing NVQ courses, at 
least for employers (Interview 7). Second, it might further impair the provision of high-
quality, relevant training, which is already an issue for SMEs. Indeed, in a FSB survey 
conducted in 2017 among SMEs, lack of training in relevant subject areas (12 percent), 
and belief that training is not relevant to business needs and questions over quality of 
courses (12 percent) were mentioned among the main challenges to train (with a higher 
rate among those SMEs which actually provided training) (FSB 2017). Concerns over 
the quality of apprenticeship training might, again, discourage SMEs from engaging 
with the system, leading to a vicious circle. 
Government data show how these institutional disadvantages translate into high train-
ing costs for SMEs: the smaller the firm, the higher the costs associated with training 
management and provider fees. Conversely, larger firms face lower management costs 
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and devote a higher share of their training expenditure toward apprentices’ salaries 
(UKCES 2016, 113). This section has explained this outcome by mapping how the de-
sign of the VET system creates an institutional disadvantage for SMEs in the UK.
Italy
There are three main avenues for vocational training in Italy. First, regional govern-
ments offer three- and four-year vocational courses through private training providers, 
which are quite narrow and do not lead to a school diploma (Cedefop 2016). Second, 
Higher Technical Institutes, introduced in 2010, are public–private partnerships be-
tween upper-secondary schools, local governments, training providers, businesses, and 
university departments. They also provide training in mechatronics but at a higher level 
(ISCED-5) than the German dual VET system or the British standard apprenticeship; 
furthermore, their diffusion is still limited – since 2014 they trained only between 350 
and 450 technicians a year (Indire 2019). Hence, in order to be able to cross-nationally 
compare vocational training in mechatronics, this section focuses on the third and most 
common VET avenue: the mechatronics curriculum in technical schools. 
The governance of the national school system is the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Education, which develops the framework for school-based education in consultation 
with the National Committee for Public Education, composed of representatives of 
teachers and schools (Cedefop 2016). This framework sets the objectives of the edu-
cational process, the “specific learning objectives,” the subjects in the minimum na-
tional curriculum (including the annual number of teaching hours for each of them), 
the compulsory timetable for curricula, standards for the quality of education services, 
and general criteria for pupil assessment. Within that prescriptive framework, schools 
develop their educational offer, adapting it to the cultural, social, and economic require-
ments at local level (MIUR 2014). For instance, the mechatronics curriculum typically 
focuses on the machines used in the local manufacturing industries, which are made 
available to the schools by the local companies (Interview 15). 
In 2015, the school reform (Law 107/2015) tried to bring schools closer to the labour 
market by introducing the obligation to undertake 400 hours of workplace-based train-
ing in the last three years of technical schools (alternanza). This allows schools to access 
up-to-date technologies (Interviews 16, 17). The Ministry of Education made €100m 
per year available for alternanza, which was matched by the same amount from the 
European Social Fund in 2018 (MIUR 2018; Il Sole 24ore 2018). Schools need to apply 
for the funding with a project developed in collaboration with local employers. The 
funding goes toward covering the costs that a school incurs during the project, e. g., 
provision of health and safety training and arranging for the transport of students, but 
it does not cover the costs for employers. 
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Large employers are more likely to coordinate with schools for alternanza projects be-
cause they have more resources in terms of time and staff; furthermore, they are usually 
also better known and can accommodate a large number of students so they are more 
likely to be approached by a school (Interviews 15, 18, 19). In contrast, SMEs are more 
likely to encounter challenges in participating in alternanza projects due to their lim-
ited resources (Interviews 15, 20). There are parallels here to the challenges faced by 
SMEs in the UK, which are expected to participate in developing trailblazer standards, 
to provide on-the-job training and find training providers on their own. However, it 
is important to remember that the state already directly provides free vocational edu-
cation up to level ISCED-4 so the alternanza project is comparatively less broad and 
complex to develop and coordinate, and it is short (400 hours max); hence, alternanza 
mainly provides an opportunity to identify good candidates and to “test” them (Inter-
view 21). Furthermore, because schools need to find business partners for their projects, 
the participation of SMEs is actively encouraged by the schools themselves, employers’ 
associations, and the government (Interviews 15, 18). 
This participation is facilitated in a number of ways. In order to make it easier for their 
members to participate, employers’ associations have developed alternanza projects at 
the regional level – with the regional education offices and the local chambers of com-
merce – or at the national level – with the Ministry of Education. Schools are then in-
vited to use those frameworks, adapting them to their needs and those of their partner 
companies, which therefore need to invest less time and resources in developing the 
project. For instance, in 2015 the metal employers’ association, the Ministry of Educa-
tion, and the National Institute of Education Research launched the alternanza pro-
gramme “Traineeship” in mechatronics, which was then implemented in fifty selected 
technical institutes (Indire 2016).
Most importantly, SMEs are embedded in local networks, which are formed and/or 
activated to organize training. The “leader” of each network is the school (Interview 
22), which coordinates the actors involved in the alternanza project and manages the 
funding. Local chambers of commerce facilitate the contact between schools and SMEs 
as they have the responsibility to build and manage online platforms where companies 
willing to participate in the projects can register; furthermore, the local associations of 
small employers can serve as intermediaries between their members and the schools 
(Interview 23). Local chambers of commerce also manage vouchers, provided by the 
Ministry of Education, that SMEs can use to employ the tutors (Camera di commercio 
di Torino 2018). Furthermore, as part of a network, SMEs can “piggyback” onto already 
existing projects in their local schools, as suggested by an interview partner from the 
metal employers’ association: 
It does not have to be the case that the small company has to develop a project from scratch. If 
there is a network of companies which works together with that particular school, the project 
development will have some common basic elements and the project will be then developed 
more in detail for the specific company and students […]. (Interview 24)
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In most cases, these projects in conjunction with a school were initiated by a large em-
ployer and then extended to its suppliers and other local SMEs (Interviews 17, 18). The 
dimension of “network” or even “supply chain” is often built in the alternanza project 
itself. As it is too time-consuming and burdensome for SMEs to host students for the 
entire period of alternanza, a rotation is organized across different companies belong-
ing to the same supply chain. The integration of a “supply-chain logic” is also seen as 
a good instrument to involve SMEs in alternanza by the Ministry of Education, which 
has actively promoted it by offering additional funding for projects involving lead firms 
and their suppliers (MIUR 2018).
In summary, given the central role of the state in the VET system, SMEs (as well as 
large employers) can shift most of the costs of training onto the state. Therefore the 
state works as a powerful “equalising” mechanism: around 30 percent of SMEs engage 
in training, which is a similar percentage to the UK (26.6 percent), but large employers 
also rely on the state, as their participation rate is only eight percentage points higher 
than SMEs, a very small participation gap. For the same reason, costs are quite low – 
companies with between twenty and fifty employees spend on average around €1,180 
per employee/year (compared to £2,800 in the UK) and employers with above 250 em-
ployees spend less than €100 more (ISTAT 2015). Furthermore, when SMEs’ direct in-
volvement in skill formation is required due to the alternanza, the local networks of 
schools, companies, and employers’ associations and chambers of commerce that they 
are embedded in help them to navigate the system and reduce the cost of participating. 
Germany
Employers and their representatives, trade unions, schools, and the government are all 
involved in the standard-setting process of the German VET system. The legislation 
provides the main framework, but the specific occupational standards are developed 
and updated as a result of employers’ initiatives. The standards for workplace-based 
training (70 percent of the curriculum) and examinations are discussed and agreed 
upon by employers’ representatives, trade unions, and the government at national level 
(Govet 2018). The learning plan for schools is developed and updated by the Confer-
ence of the Ministers of Education in consultation with regional committees constituted 
by workers’ representatives, employers’ representatives, and officials of the regional gov-
ernment, as well as with vocational training committees, constituted by six employers’ 
representatives, six workers’ representatives, and six teachers (Büchter 2018, 42). The 
school-based component (30 percent) is dedicated to learning more “theoretical” con-
tent and the learning plan is standardised across schools, which the latter get “ready-
to-go” (fix und fertig) from the tripartite regional committee so they have limited room 
for manoeuvre (Interview 28). The exam is administered by the local chamber of com-
merce and industry (IHK), which also nominates the exam committee constituted by 
employers, workers’ representatives, and teachers (BIBB 2017). Membership in the lo-
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cal chamber of industry and commerce is compulsory and involves contributing a lump 
sum per year in addition to 0.2 percent of yearly business earnings; on top of that, the 
intermediate and final exams each cost around €700 (Interview 29; Prueferportal 2018). 
Employers and schools are directly involved in training provision. By law, schools are 
independent from employers and are publicly funded. While schools coordinate with 
employers, they are not forced, and do not have an incentive either, to adapt their cur-
riculum to the needs of large employers, even if they provide most of the students. Re-
gional governments plan the distribution of schools, making sure that all young adults 
have a vocational school in commutable distance and to match the skill demand from 
local firms. As achieving these two objectives is particularly challenging in peripheral 
and structurally weak regions, and given the declining number of apprentices, the Con-
ference of the Ministers of Education recently suggested mergers between schools and 
encouraged companies to start an apprenticeship cohort every two years (rather than 
each year); furthermore, it made programmes more flexible so that students on differ-
ent apprenticeship tracks can attend the same class (Büchter 2018). 
Employers, however, decide how to implement the curriculum in the workplace and 
cover the costs for tutoring staff, infrastructures, exam fees, and apprentices’ salary and 
benefits. For the mechatronics curriculum, employers are estimated to spend around 
€14,000/year per apprentice (Govet 2018). As they invest in their own training centres 
and material and higher salaries, large employers pay more for apprentices than SMEs 
– companies with between ten and fifty employees spend £4,254 per apprentice/year, 
companies with between 50 and 500 spend £5,391 per apprentice/year, while compa-
nies with above 500 employees spend £7,354 per apprentice/year (Jansen et al. 2015). 
Yet, SMEs have been found to struggle to sustain these costs (Culpepper and Thelen 
2007; Thelen and Busemeyer 2012) because they do not have the instruments, machines, 
and tutors to provide the different modules that constitute an apprenticeship, especially 
one as broad and complex as the mechatronics curriculum. Indeed, as the CPE litera-
ture on segmentalist trends in VET suggests (Thelen and Busemeyer 2012), SMEs par-
ticipate less in VET than large employers, as 59 percent of companies with between ten 
and forty-nine employees provide training compared to 93.6 percent of companies with 
above 250 employees. Yet, it needs to be noted that the participation gap between SMEs 
and large employers is still eight percentage points lower (34 percent) than the partici-
pation gap in the UK (42 percent; Eurostat 2018). 
Indeed, there are institutionalised arrangements to deal with the issue of costs for SMEs, 
such as inter-company training centres and network-based training. The former is a 
state-led instrument while the latter is primarily business-based but the underlying 
logic is similar as they both have the function of making training affordable for SMEs 
by building economies of scale and offloading onto the state parts of the costs of work-
place-based training. The rather understudied inter-company training centres were set 
up in 1973 to offer specialised high-quality training modules for integrating the appren-
ticeship curriculum of SMEs. Hence, they represent the third “learning site” in addition 
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to vocational schools and companies, which SMEs can “use” if they lack the required 
staff and infrastructures. These centres are funded primarily by the federal government 
and the regional government but also by local chambers of commerce, which are most 
often responsible for their management. The rate of funding from the national govern-
ment is higher in structurally weak regions (BMBF 2016). 
Second, since 2005 the Vocational Training Act introduced institutionalised forms of 
network-based collaboration among firms (Verbundausbildung), which are meant to al-
low sharing the “burden” of apprenticeship (Interview 30). The government sees in the 
network-based apprenticeship an instrument to counteract the decline of apprentice-
ships, and it offers additional funding to participating companies (BMBF 2018), as in 
North Rhine-Westphalia where each apprenticeship position can be supported with a 
one-off payment of up to €4,500 (NRW 2009). Local chambers of commerce also play 
a crucial role in the network-based VET because they register the contracts among the 
companies in addition to the contracts between apprentices and their employer (Inter-
view 29). Furthermore, they provide services aimed at connecting SMEs; for instance, 
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Berlin has an online platform, where com-
panies can post their offers of training modules and try to find a match with other SMEs 
(Marktplatz-Verbundausbildung 2019).
In sum, unlike in the UK, German SMEs can resort to a number of institutional arrange-
ments that support their training endeavours. Firstly, they can rely on interfirm networks 
to organize their training, which help them achieve economies of scale and share the 
costs of an expensive apprenticeship programme. Secondly, the state supports interfirm 
cooperation through inter-company training centres and targeted financial support. Fi-
nally, the public school system ensures that school programmes in mechatronics of com-
parable quality and content are accessible to SMEs and large employers alike. 
6 Discussion and conclusion
This article sought to explain the comparative disadvantage of SMEs vis-à-vis large em-
ployers in the UK in the institutional arena of VET. We conceptualize this disadvantage 
along the two key dimensions of “buy,” which we conceive as the ability to access skills 
on the external education and labour markets, and “make,” which we understand as the 
ability to develop skills, chiefly in the form of apprenticeship programmes. Leveraging 
Italy and Germany as shadow cases, we unpacked the mechanisms leading to British 
SMEs’ institutional disadvantage. The central finding of our study is that British quasi-
market institutions set high entry barriers and transaction costs for SMEs, while reduc-
ing the opportunities to create economies of scale. 
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Our findings suggest that “employer ownership,” the guiding principle of British VET 
policy, militates against SMEs. First, the standards, especially since the introduction of 
trailblazer groups dominated by large employers, are complex, costly, and difficult to 
implement. Their competence-based nature requires knowledge and resources to de-
velop the curriculum and coordinate with training providers, leading to high manage-
ment costs that are not covered by the already insufficient government funding. Even 
though quasi-market mechanisms are supposed to give employers more choice in terms 
of price and quality, SMEs experience great difficulty in finding a local provider deliver-
ing relevant and high-quality training because of their limited clout. The limited lever-
age of SMEs on the quasi-market for training is due to their small number of students, 
their dependence on scarce and centralised government funding in combination with 
a lack of institutional inputs to coordinate their skill demands through the government, 
local employer associations, and chambers of commerce. 
It is precisely the availability of these institutional inputs that allow SMEs in Germany 
and Italy to build economies of scale through business-led and state-led coordination. 
In both Germany and Italy, school distribution over the national territory is decided 
by the government, which is primarily interested in providing equal education oppor-
tunities across regions. In line with this principle, the school curriculum is relatively 
detailed and standardised at the national level and school-based education is funded by 
the state. In Italy, this implies that employers benefit from “free” vocational education 
up to a certain level, with no management costs involved. In Germany, the national 
and regional governments fund inter-company training centres and provide additional 
funding for inter-company training networks, also supported by the local chambers of 
commerce. Similarly, in Italy the government has made extra funding available for alter-
nanza projects involving networks of SMEs, especially along a supply chain, and local 
chambers of commerce and employers’ associations play an active role in facilitating the 
collaboration between schools and SMEs.
Overall, our analysis reveals how institutions in Italy and Germany help SMEs to access 
and/or develop skills, while SMEs in Britain are not supported in this endeavour, and 
thus are unable to overcome their institutional disadvantage in the domain of voca-
tional education and training. These findings have important theoretical implications. 
We primarily contribute to the VoC literature by looking at how different institutional 
settings affect firm strategies in the realm of vocational training as we unpack the insti-
tutional disadvantage faced by SMEs across political economies. By so doing, we show 
that VET institutions are characterised by greater within-country diversity, complexity, 
and heterogeneity than often assumed in the CPE literature (Lane and Wood 2012; 
Streeck and Thelen 2005). First, we show that the effect of VET institutions is not ho-
mogenous across firms within a particular national institutional setting. While institu-
tions are often described as resources (Jackson and Deeg 2008), firms, depending on 
their size, vary in the extent to which they need them, but also in their ability to tap 
into these resources (Josefy et al. 2015). Our study thus echoes previous work on the 
differences between small and large firms in a variety of settings, such as employment 
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relations (Saridakis et al. 2008) or finance (Bluhm and Martens 2009); however, thanks 
to the cross-country comparative nature of our study, we are also able to show that the 
“liability of smallness” in the VET domain varies across countries and it depends on 
the institutional context. More specifically, a key finding is that VET institutions vary 
in their ability to level the playing field for SMEs, an objective that they can achieve 
by reducing the costs of access to or development of skills. In particular, the British 
quasi-market institutions are exacerbating inequalities, while non-market coordination 
mechanisms in Italy and in Germany prove effective at levelling the playing field. 
Yet, the coordination mechanisms that we find in the VET domain do not fully reflect 
the modes of coordination typically attributed to each model of capitalism: state-led co-
ordination in Italy, business-led coordination in Germany, and market-led coordination 
in the UK. Indeed, our second contribution consists of highlighting the heterogeneity of 
VET institutions, which have differentiated features to serve the needs of SMEs. These 
have been typically neglected in the CPE literature, not least due to its large-employer 
bias. In the UK, the state plays a central, albeit detrimental, role in creating a quasi-mar-
ket for training accessible also to SMEs; moreover, business-led coordination, which 
is central in the post levy system through the trailblazer groups, is tilted toward large 
employers. In Germany, where the VET system is typically co-managed by the unions 
and employers through their membership associations and chambers of commerce, the 
state also plays an important role in supporting SMEs through the funding of inter-
company networks and training centres, and this intervention has been strengthened 
in recent years. This finding is consistent with Culpepper and Thelen’s expectation that, 
to countervail segmentalist trends, the costs of the German dual system will be “shifted 
in explicit or subtle ways to the states or federal government – for example, through 
direct subsidies for more collectivized training provision for small and service sector 
employers” (2008, 45). In Italy, in addition to the traditional role of the state, a pivotal 
role in support of SMEs is played by local networks of companies, schools, regional 
school offices and local chambers of commerce, and by inter-organizational networks 
along the supply chain. This finding reminds us of pre-VoC research, which depicted 
Italian capitalism as heavily reliant on local and/or regional networks (Locke 1995; Bur-
roni and Trigilia 2001). Overall, training networks thus emerge as a possible device for 
SMEs to curtail some of their institutional disadvantages. Correspondingly, they are 
increasingly widespread in a number of countries, including Switzerland (Imdorf and 
Leemann 2012) and the United States (Fortwengel and Jackson 2016). 
Our findings have implications also for the literature on inter-employer cleavages and 
institutional change. By highlighting the complex role of VET institutions for SMEs 
across political economies, our in-depth empirical analysis suggests that more atten-
tion should be paid to the institutional context in the endogenous process of employer 
preferences formation (see the discussion in Trampusch 2010). Existing literature has 
so far exclusively focused on CMEs, claiming that SMEs would prefer the “collectivist” 
solution while large employers value the opportunity to develop “firm-specific” skills 
(e. g., Busemeyer and Trampusch 2012). However, employer preferences might vary 
22 MPIfG Discussion Paper 20/4
across political economies. For instance, given the institutional features of the British 
VET system, large employers pushed for and actively participated in the development 
of industry-specific qualifications at the national level, while SMEs typically prefer pur-
chasing firm-specific training in order to avoid the flaws of the quasi-market. While it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to analyse the development of employer preferences for 
VET in the UK, this example suggests that the theoretical framework on inter-employer 
cleavages and institutional change could be expanded to different varieties of capitalism 
if the analysis of employer preferences incorporated our insights on the relevant institu-
tional mechanisms for SMEs in the VET arena. 
More broadly, future research could look at how the institutional disadvantage of SMEs 
is grounded in complementary relationships between institutional domains, such as 
those between training, the labour market, and employment relations. Future work 
could also pay closer attention to the role of the state across countries. For example, 
how do state policies reinforce institutional disadvantages of SMEs? How do they seek 
to level the playing field and how successful are they? Addressing these questions would 
be important, and would contribute to the growing stream of literature within institu-
tional and comparative studies that highlights state actors and their contribution to in-
stitutional stability and change of skill formation systems across varieties of capitalism 
(Trampusch 2014; Fortwengel, Gospel, and Toner 2019) as well as other policy areas, 
such as industrial policy (Bulfone 2019). 
Our concluding reflection is that paying attention to organizational size in the analysis of 
(VET) institutions allows us to uncover new patterns of cross-national variation in skill 
formation. More broadly, we encourage future work in CPE to take a differential view on 
firms within a particular variety of capitalism, as institutions may have particular impli-
cations for different “recipients.” Additional comparative research in other countries and 
institutional arenas could further substantiate the importance of organizational size to 
explain the differential effects of institutions, and thus help in painting a more accurate 
picture of the relationship between firms and institutions across countries. 
Benassi, Durazzi, and Fortwengel: Not All Firms Are Created Equal 23
Appendix
List of interviews
Interview 1, employer association, UK, 22.04.15
Interview 2, manufacturing employer 1, UK, 09.01.17
Interview 3, manufacturing employer 2, UK, 31.10.17
Interview 4, manufacturing employer 3, UK, 30.01.17
Interview 5, manufacturing employer 4, UK, 10.01.18
Interview 6, manufacturing employer 4, UK, 10.02.18
Interview 7, government officer, UK, 27.10.17
Interview 8, engineering & manufacturing employer association, UK, 08.05.18
Interview 9, training provider, UK, 17.10.17
Interview 10, metal employer association, UK, 22.11.17
Interview 11, small business association, UK, 17.10.18
Interview 12, manufacturing employer 4, UK, 10.01.18
Interview 13, engineering & manufacturing employer association 2, UK, 17.11.16
Interview 14, manufacturing employer 2, UK, 24.07.17
Interview 15, technical school 1, IT, 20.12.17
Interview 16, local government education unit, IT, 08.01.19
Interview 17, local employer association, IT, 12.02.18
Interview 18, technical school 2, IT, 06.07.17
Interview 19, manufacturing employer 1, IT, 14.11.17
Interview 20, local manufacturing employer association 2, IT, 10.01.19
Interview 21, manufacturing employer 2, IT, 21.04.17
Interview 22, small business association, IT, 11.01.19
Interview 23, local employer association 2, IT, 14.02.18
Interview 24, metal employer association, IT, 17.01.19
Interview 25, regional training provider, IT, 22.05.18
Interview 26, government officer, IT, 07.01.19 
Interview 27, small business association 2, IT, 10.01.19
Interview 28, technical school, DE, 16.11.17
Interview 29, local chamber of commerce, DE, 06.07.18
Interview 30, local metal employer association, DE, 10.04.17
Interview 31, manufacturing employer 1, DE, 31.05.17
Interview 32, manufacturing employer 1, DE, 05.09.17
Interview 33, technical university, DE, 31.05.17
Interview 34, metal employer association, DE, 07.12.16
Interview 35, manufacturing employer 2, DE, 23.02.18
Interview 36, manufacturing employer 3, DE, 28.04.17 
Interview 37, manufacturing employer 4, DE, 02.06.17 
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Table A1 Documents coded in NVivo
Document type DE IT UK
Interviews 10 13 14
Policy reports 3 2 24
Promotion and information material 7 4 6
Fieldwork notes 3 2 4
News 0 2 2
Academic literature 2 0 7
Total 25 23 57
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ökonomischem, sozialem und politischem Handeln. Mit  
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politische und kulturelle Zusammenhänge eingebettet  
sind, wie sie entstehen und wie sich ihre gesellschaftlichen  
Kontexte verändern. Das Institut schlägt eine Brücke  
zwischen Theorie und Politik und leistet einen Beitrag  
zur politischen Diskussion über zentrale Fragen  
moderner Gesellschaften.
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of modern societies. It aims to develop an empirically 
based theory of the social and political foundations  
of modern economies by investigating the interrelation 
between economic, social and political action. Using 
primarily an institutional approach, it examines how 
markets and business organizations are embedded 
in historical, political and cultural frameworks, how  
they develop, and how their social contexts change  
over time. The Institute seeks to build a bridge between  
theory and policy and to contribute to political debate  
on major challenges facing modern societies.
